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n their paper, Philip Robins and Charles Michalopoulos 
project the impacts of an earnings-supplement program 
modeled after Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP).1 The 
distinguishing characteristic of this program involves a benefit 
structure designed to encourage welfare recipients to work full-
time. This commentary addresses the following questions:
• What are the key features of the proposed program?
• How does the authors’ study evaluate the program?
• How reliable is this evaluation?
Description of the Proposed
Earnings-Supplement Program
The critical element of SSP is that it pays benefits based on the 
number of hours per week an individual works. The benefits 
schedule offers nothing until a person reaches thirty hours per 
week, then it pays a large amount exactly at thirty hours. This 
amount is inversely related to a person’s wage rate. As a person 
increases hours of work beyond thirty hours, benefits are 
reduced much in the same way as they are in other welfare 
programs. Although an hours-limitation feature is an 
uncommon feature of U.S. welfare programs, many programs 
in Europe have such elements. In Great Britain, for example, 
the Family Credit program gives a bonus to families when they 
reach sixteen hours per week, and another bonus for thirty 
hours.
To gauge the size of SSP payments for the most generous 
version of the program considered by Robins and 
Michalopoulos, Chart 1 compares the benefits paid by the 
federal earned income tax credit (EITC) with those paid by the 
SSP program with a target annual earnings level of $30,000. 
When an individual works more than thirty hours per week, he 
is eligible to receive ½∗($30,000 - actual earnings) in addition 
to his actual earnings. The chart depicts the supplement for 
three cases, differentiated by the wage of the worker: a worker 
who earns $6 per hour, a second who earns $9, and a third who 
receives $12. The $6-per-hour worker begins to receive the 
supplement when his monthly earnings are $780, the amount 
he would earn if he worked exactly thirty hours per week. The 
initial supplement of $860 for this hypothetical worker more 
than doubles his earnings. For each additional dollar he earns, 
his supplement is reduced by fifty cents. The chart shows that 
individuals receiving hourly wages of $9 and $12 become 
eligible for the SSP benefit at higher levels of monthly earnings, 
$1,170 and $1,560, respectively. It also highlights the different 
incentives attached to the EITC, which does not base benefits on 
hours worked, as compared with the SSP. Under the EITC, each 
additional hour of work is rewarded with a positive transfer up 
until monthly earnings reach $780. In contrast, when total 
weekly hours are less than thirty, an additional hour of work does 
not result in any supplement according to the SSP program.
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To illustrate further the implications of the SSP program on 
work incentives, Chart 2 shows changes in monthly disposable 
income as a family’s earnings increase in conjunction with 
benefits paid from the federal EITC, the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program, and the SSP program. 
The chart shows how disposable income changes for an 
additional $100 in monthly earnings under two scenarios: one 
in which a family receives TANF and EITC benefits (termed a 
TANF family) and a second in which the family also qualifies 
for the SSP program (designated an SSP family). In addition to 
an adjustment for benefit changes, all computations account 
for the payment of Social Security and income taxes. The 
changes displayed in the chart are based on the TANF benefit 
schedule for California, which pays benefits that are about 
15 percent higher than the most generous level paid by the 
states considered by Robins and Michalopoulos. According to 
the chart, disposable income rises approximately $110 for the 
first $100 earned by either a TANF or an SSP family. The three 
large spikes in the chart depict the large increase in disposable 
income occurring when the SSP program first goes into effect 
at thirty work hours per week for eligible recipients. The 
locations of these spikes reflect the different monthly earning 
thresholds at which workers with different hourly wages 
initially receive the SSP benefit.
To highlight the impact of the SSP program on work 
incentives, Chart 3 duplicates Chart 2, except that 1) the vertical 
scale is reduced to magnify changes in disposable income 
ranging from -$25 to $125 and 2) the chart isolates changes only 
for a family that makes $9 per hour. The chart shows that 
changes in disposable income across monthly earnings are 
identical for TANF and SSP families when monthly earnings 
range from $0 to $1,100, the point at which the SSP benefit is first 
given. When earnings increase from $1,100 to $1,200, the TANF 
family sees a decrease in disposable income of $2.80 while the 
SSP family witnesses a one-time increase of approximately $390. 
However, the increase in disposable income for SSP families for 
the next $100 in additional earnings—from $1,200 to $1,300—is 
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relationship between the two programs is reversed; this increase 
in earnings causes about a $30 increase in disposable income for 
TANF families and only a $6 increase for SSP families. Changes 
in disposable income occurring to families under TANF remain 
higher than those under SSP until monthly earnings reach 
$2,600, when these programs are no longer relevant.
Thus, the work incentive created by the SSP program varies 
according to the level of weekly hours worked. For incremental 
changes at low hours, TANF and SSP families face the same work 
incentives, since the SSP program pays nothing. The SSP program 
offers a large incentive for a family to increase hours up to thirty. 
After thirty hours, work incentives are generally worse for the SSP 
family. So, if the objective is to induce workers to raise hours from 
thirty to forty, a typical definition of full-time work, SSP works 
against achieving this goal.
Approach for Predicting Impacts of 
the Earnings-Supplement Program
To predict the impact of introducing an SSP program, Robins 
and Michalopoulos posit a specific utility optimization 
framework and presume that families in the target population 
select hours of work according to this model. In essence, they 
implement a “simulation” approach to solve this optimization 
problem and to forecast responses.
Specifications Selected by the Robins-
Michalopoulos Study
The functional forms for preferences assumed by Robins and 
Michalopoulos in conducting their analysis come from Moffitt 
(1983), a well-known empirical study analyzing the effects of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits on 
welfare participation and hours of work. The maintained labor 
supply equation takes the form:
1)
for a person who receives welfare, and
2)
for nonwelfare participants. An individual participates in 
welfare when
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The variable   represents weekly hours of work,   is the 
gross hourly wage rate,   is nonwage income excluding 
welfare,   reflects the benefit reduction rate associated with the 
welfare program, and   is welfare benefits at zero hours of 
work. A person does not work when  and   or 
when   and  . The coefficient   is an intercept 
dependent on a linear function of age, race, education, 
unemployment, and family composition;   measures the 
substitution effect;   determines the income response; and the 
parameters   and   allow for the presence of welfare stigma.
Robins and Michalopoulos assume coefficient values and 
distributions broadly consistent with Moffitt’s econometric 
model. For coefficients, they select values estimated by Moffitt. 
Also, as in Moffitt, the authors interpret the intercept of the 
labor supply function,  , and welfare sigma,  , as being 
randomly distributed across families;   and   equal normally 
distributed error terms added to fitted values estimated by 
Moffitt. Robins and Michalopoulos estimate a predicted value 
for wages using a simple linear regression equation, and they 
add a normally distributed error to this value to assign wages 
for nonworkers.
Overview of the Robins-Michalopoulos 
Simulation Procedure
To achieve their underlying goal of imputing distributions for 
wages,  , and  , Robins and Michalopoulos simulate hours 
worked and welfare participation for each low-income family 
in their sample, given the AFDC benefit schedules actually 
faced by the family. To construct these distributions, Robins 
and Michalopoulos first draw one random variable, an error 
determining the value of  , for each member of the sample 
who works. Using data on an averaged hourly wage, they then 
evaluate hours from equations 1 and 2 depending on whether 
the family participates in welfare. This hours calculation 
implicitly determines a value for the coefficient   (the 
intercept of the labor supply equation). Using the value drawn 
for   and the constructed values of wages and hours, equation 
3 determines whether the family receives welfare. If the 
resulting outcomes agree with the observed hours of work and 
welfare status of the sample member—and are consistent with 
highest utility—these imputed values of wage,  , and   are 
assigned to this family. If, however, the outcomes disagree with 
the observed data, then the procedure is repeated with new 
random draws for   until agreement is achieved. The process 
then moves on to assignments for the next sample member.
For sample members who do not work, Robins and 
Michalopoulos modify the above procedure by drawing two 
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disturbance determining the value of  . Computing wages as 
the sum of a fitted value and the drawn error, they calculate 
hours and welfare participation from equations 1-3 using this 
value of the wage and the drawn realizations of   and  . If the 
simulation reveals outcomes inconsistent with observed 
behavior, the process is repeated with new random draws. 
Once agreement with observed data is found, the constructed 
values of wage,  , and   are assigned to the sample member.
At the end of this procedure, each family has been assigned 
values for the random variables of the model, which are then 
fixed for conducting counterfactual exercises. To forecast 
impacts of the SSP program, Robins and Michalopoulos alter 
benefit schedules to reflect the addition of the SSP benefits and 
then calculate changes in hours of work implied by their 
behavioral model. They then use these new hours to calculate 
changes in disposable income and program costs.
Concerns about the Reliability
of Predicted Impacts
Carrying out a counterfactual analysis of the type performed by 
Robins and Michalopoulos always involves making 
compromises subject to criticism. This discussion briefly notes 
three categories of potential shortcomings: 1) problematic 
features of the underlying economic/empirical model, 
2) incompatibilities between the simulation model and its 
estimated variant, and 3) modifications needed to conduct the 
simulation exercise.
Conceptual Features of the Economic Model
A major shortcoming concerns the presumption by Robins and 
Michalopoulos that all adjustments in annual hours of work 
come in the form of changes in weekly hours instead of shifts in 
the number of weeks worked per year. Even a casual 
examination of data on annual hours worked reveals that 
exactly the opposite is true; most adjustments occur in changes 
in the number of weeks worked per year. Moreover, the 
estimated empirical model used by the authors to calibrate 
their model merely measures the impact of changes in wages 
and income on a person’s weekly hours, but it offers minimal 
capacity to assess effects on number of weeks worked over any 
extended period. Unless participation is determined 
independently across weeks for the given family, or is perfectly 




random survey week cannot be used to infer a family’s annual, 
quarterly, or monthly hours. Furthermore, one cannot assess 
the degree to which benefit programs encourage more hours 
worked per week at the expense of fewer weeks worked. Robins 
and Michalopoulos focus on hours per week because this is the 
target variable of the SSP program, even though they consider 
payments from this program in an annual context analogous to 
the way in which the EITC program operates. The reasoning 
underlying the authors’ linkage between hours per week and 
hours per year is questionable.
Predictions rely critically on the applicability of the labor 
supply function maintained in the simulation exercise, and 
the static linear specification assumed here is difficult to 
justify. The most fundamental shortcoming is that the labor 
supply function must apply globally for all ranges of wages 
and income observed in the data. This is a challenge not 
attained by most empirical specifications with only one 
source of randomness in tastes. Moreover, this same 
specification determines labor force participation, meaning 
that its parameters govern whether or not a person works. 
Unfortunately, such specifications have been found to be 
grossly incompatible with the data whenever tested. The 
static character of the assumed specification also gives rise to 
some concern, for it presumes that individuals ignore 
impacts of current work experience on future choices and 
opportunities, thus ruling out trade-offs between hours 
across periods. Moreover, such static specifications ignore 
responses motivated to avoid sanctions and time limits, 
which have become critical elements of states’ welfare 
systems.
Selected Calibration of the Simulation Model
In addition to questions about the applicability of the behavioral 
underpinnings of the Robins-Michalopoulos simulation model, 
the authors’ selection of parameter values and distributional 
assumptions raises concerns about the accuracy of hours 
projections. To be accurate, the model must be calibrated using 
values associated with the circumstances relevant for the 
simulation. There are two shortcomings in this regard.
First, the treatment of missing wages in this analysis creates 
problems with predictive accuracy. Robins and Michalopoulos 
simply impute wages using fitted values from conventional 
regression estimation, ignoring potential sample selection that 
will alter predictions for particular disadvantaged groups. In 
contrast, Moffitt (1983) accounts for sample selection in his 
estimation of missing wages. This adjustment leads to 
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value and other moments of the wage distribution used in the 
simulated and the estimated versions of the model.
Second, whereas Robins and Michalopoulos use their model 
to predict the behavioral responses of a highly dependent 
population of welfare recipients, their choice of coefficient 
values and evaluation points for parameters specifying 
distributions comes from Moffitt, who estimates his model on 
a nationally representative sample of single-female households. 
Only 10 percent of the Robins-Michalopoulos sample worked 
at the baseline, and 80 percent received AFDC and food stamps 
for at least eleven months in the previous year. These numbers 
far exceed those for the representative population of female-
headed families; Moffitt reports that only 35 percent of his 
sample received welfare benefits. The resulting parameters 
presented in Moffitt are unlikely to be applicable to the Robins-
Michalopoulos population. Consequently, even if all the 
functional forms of distributions correctly describe outcomes 
for welfare populations, the values at which the authors 
evaluate parameters yield distributions that do not fit their data 
in the baseline simulation.
Conceptual Problem with the Simulation 
Approach
When random variables enter specifications nonlinearly, 
simulation methods dictate that many draws must be assigned 
to each sample observation to calculate distributions. For 
example, if a researcher wishes to infer the distribution of the 
quantity  , and   follows a density  , then constructing 
a histogram of the values  ,  , , , with each   
representing an independent draw from  , computes this 
distribution. A single draw and the resulting value   do 
not estimate this distribution. Instead, one requires a sufficient 
number of simulated values to obtain consistent estimates of 
the statistic of interest.
As interpreted above, Robins and Michalopoulos conduct 
their simulation with only a single draw assigned to each 
gi x () x f x ()
gi xk () k   … Nx k
fx ()
gi xk ()
sample member. This might be appropriate to compute 
statistics if the  ’s are linear in their random components, or 
if many welfare families are observationally equivalent 
possessing identical  ’s—identical abstracting from the value 
of  . However, neither of these conditions holds in the 
authors’ analysis. Nonlinear budget constraints and 
nonconvexities alone rule out linearity of the   analogues. The 
existence of families residing in different states and with 
differing economic endowments implies that  ’s vary across 
observations. Thus, a proper analysis should include many 
assigned simulated draws for each sample member.
Conclusion
The paper by Robins and Michalopoulos is an enlightening 
contribution to a topic that is central to the debate on welfare 
reform. The above commentary suggests that researchers 
should consider three modifications in future applications. 
First, to evaluate features of earnings-supplement programs 
aimed at influencing weekly hours, the underlying empirical/
economic model should not only incorporate hours per week, 
but also weeks worked per year or some other relevant period 
allowing for trade-offs between weekly hours and weeks 
worked. Moreover, to describe the behavior of any population 
with a substantial segment that does not work, the model must 
allow for factors to impact interior solutions for hours of work 
different from labor force participation decisions. Second, one 
needs to calibrate the model to fit the sample used in 
simulation. This requires adjusting coefficient values and/or 
distributions to account for how a simulation sample differs 
from the data used in estimating parameters of the model. 
Estimating parameters of the model using the simulation sample 
offers one method for accomplishing this task, but less onerous 
options are available. Lastly, the simulation implementation 
must assign enough random draws for each sample obser-







1. Portions of this commentary pertain to an unpublished technical 
appendix to the Robins-Michalopoulos paper.
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